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CONSTRUCTIVE-ENGAGEMENT DIALOGUE
DON’T STOP BELIEVING:
AN ARGUMENT AGAINST BUDDHIST SKEPTICISM
LAURA GUERRERO
Ethan Mills’ Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India: Nāgārjuna, Jayarāśi, and
Śrī Harṣa is an ambitious book. I say ambitious because the discussion of each of his
three pillars really warrants its own book, and the attempt to identify a “tradition” of
skepticism about philosophy in Classical Indian thought by relating each thinker to
one another and to proto-skeptical trends in even earlier thought is also a really
ambitious undertaking. I am not sure Mills’ attempt has established that there is such
a tradition or that each of the thinkers is a skeptic about philosophy, however, the
work Mills has done has laid the foundation for a lot of interesting and fruitful future
work. Mills has successfully set the ball rolling, as it were, in provocative and
insightful ways. I am really glad to be able here to make my small contribution to the
conversation Mills’ book will no doubt continue to inspire.
My comments on Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India: Nāgārjuna,
Jayarāśi, and Śrī Harṣa focus on the argument, presented mostly in chapters 2 and 3,
for the claim that the Buddhist thinker Nāgārjuna is plausibly read as a skeptic about
philosophy and thus constitutes one of the three pillars of skepticism in classical
Indian philosophy. Mills characterizes skepticism about philosophy as being
composed of a family of therapies (as opposed to views) that have as their goal the
suspension of philosophical theorizing. Mills identifies several features that are
common among skepticisms about philosophy, including the use of philosophy to
undermine itself and the avoidance of drawing any theoretical conclusion. Skeptics
about philosophy generally advocate, explains Mills, for the “whole-sale refusal of
the project of forming conclusions within epistemology and other areas of
philosophy,” and thus are best characterized as engaging in “a form of intellectual
therapy with the goal of creating a mental coolness wherein one’s impulse to form
beliefs (at least about philosophical matters) is dissipated” (Mills 2018, xxvii).
Mills argues that the skeptical interpretation he defends is the most successful at
reconciling two competing tendencies in Nāgārjuna’s works: (1) Claims to the effect
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that all phenomena are empty of svabhāva (I will leave this important term
untranslated for now but will come back to it) and (2) statements to the effect that he,
Nāgārjuna, has no view. Since tendency (1) claims seem to be the articulation of a
view, tendency (2) claims are puzzling. Hence, the tension. Mills argues that reading
Nāgārjuna as a skeptic about philosophy makes the best sense of these two competing
tendencies in his work. Tendency (2) expressions are, according to Mills, reflective of
Nāgārjuna’s final skeptical stance. Tendency (1) claims are merely provisionally
adopted as the first step in a two-step dialectical progression that culminates in
skepticism. Tendency (1) claims and arguments help undermine the realist
philosophical positions of Nāgārjuna’s Naiyāyika and Ābhidharmika opponents. But
the anti-realist view reflected in tendency (1) claims—that all phenomena are empty
of svabhāva–must like the views of the opponents also be abandoned, resulting in the
complete abandonment of all philosophical views. One is lead to abandon tendency
(1) claims, argues Mills, by coming to realize that they involve an internal
contradiction. He explains,
In the first phase Nāgārjuna argues in favor of a thesis of emptiness and against essence
(svabhāva). Here Nāgārjuna can profitably be understood in anti-realist terms. In the
second phase Nāgārjuna demonstrates that, while the thesis of emptiness undermines all
other philosophical views, it also undermines itself, thus leaving one without any views,
theses, or positions whatsoever (ibid., 35).

According to Mills, the claim that all phenomena are empty of svabhāva is selfrefuting. Realizing this, he argues, leads the reflective Buddhist to abandon
philosophy and adopt the quietist attitude, reflected in tendency (2) expressions.
Mills thinks that the claim that all phenomena are empty of svabhāva–a thesis he
calls the “thesis of universal emptiness” (ibid., 26) (hereafter: TUE)–is self-refuting
because
[t]he thesis of emptiness would simultaneously possess and lack the characteristic of
being empty (it possesses the characteristic by stipulated definition and lacks it due to the
content of the idea of universal emptiness) (ibid., 35).

Here Mills points out that as a universal thesis, TUE also applies to itself–a point that
Nāgārjuna himself makes clear. Therefore, the thesis itself, as Mills puts it,
“possesses…the characteristic of being empty.” Yet Mills here argues that it could
not have this characteristic “due to the content of the idea.” About this content Mills
states that “[w]hatever else anti-realism may be, it is a philosophical theory, one that
purports to explain something about how things are; that there really is no mindindependent reality” (ibid., 34). The problem Mills sees here is that insofar as the
thesis of universal emptiness makes a claim about how things are, it is ascribing an
essence (svabhāva) to them. This, in effect, makes the claim a non-empty one because
it is stating a truth that is true in virtue of how things are essentially. Mills thus
concludes that “emptiness…cannot have the characteristic of emptiness that would
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form the content of a view about emptiness” (Mills 2018, 38). Yet given the universal
scope of the thesis, the thesis is supposed to be empty. The result appears to be a
contradiction. It is this contradiction that is supposed to motivate the move from
tendency (1) claims to the adoption of the skeptical stance reflected in tendency (2)
expressions.1
The main problem I see with Mills’ position is that TUE is not self-refuting. And
if it is not self-refuting, then there is no dialectical movement from tendency (1)
claims to tendency (2) expressions. And without the dialectical movement we again
find ourselves without a resolution of the tension between tendency (1) and tendency
(2). And given that the motivation Mills cites for accepting his skeptical interpretation
is that it is able to resolve this tension, if the thesis of universal emptiness is not selfrefuting, the motivation for taking tendency (2) statements as expressing a skeptical
position and using this as the interpretive frame through which to understand
Nāgārjuna’s thought is lost.
Furthermore, the anti-realist interpretation, defended by the likes of Jan
Westerhoff and Mark Siderits (and myself), does offer a way of reconciling the
apparent conflict between tendency (1) and tendency (2) claims.2 These anti-realists
resolve the tension by making explicit what is, they argue, implicit in the texts given
the context of discussion. The anti-realist argues that in tendency (2) claims
Nāgārjuna means to deny only that he has any views that presuppose the realist
metaphysics and epistemology of his opponents. These opponents define what a view
is–its intentional content and its truth conditions—in terms of a realist metaphysics.
Since Nāgārjuna denies those realist presuppositions, he denies he has ‘views’ as his
opponents understand them.
I argue that since the anti-realist interpretation can reconcile the two tendencies,
and the skeptical interpretation cannot, the anti-realist interpretation continues to be
the most plausible interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s texts. I say this, of course, with the
recognition that the hermeneutic situation with respect to Nāgārjuna’s texts is
difficult. The texts are cryptic and the historical context is opaque. The best we can
do is offer interpretations that are consistent with the historical and textual evidence
we have. Examination of that evidence, I argue, reveals that the apparent
contradiction Mills sees in TUE is the result of equivocating between two different
uses of the term ‘ultimate’ (paramārtha) in early Buddhist literature and, relatedly,
not being clear about what it is that Nāgārjuna is and is not denying when he denies
that any phenomenon has svabhāva. Examination of the historical context of
Nāgārjuna’s thought helps to disentangle the equivocation, revealing that TUE does
not in fact undermine itself.
1

In the conclusion of his book, Mills makes clear that his argument for the inconsistency of TUE is
developed from arguments made by Garfield and Priest (2002, 2003) for the slightly different
conclusion that TUE is paradoxical. Garfield and Priest embrace the paradoxical nature of TUE and
use it to argue for a dialethist interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s work. Mills on the other hand takes
Garfield and Priest’s arguments to show that TUE is self-contradictory and concludes that Nāgārjuna
intends TUE to be ultimately rejected in favor of skepticism about philosophy.
2
See for example Westerhoff (2009, 2010) and Siderits (2000, 2015, 2016).
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1. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: SVABHĀVA
The best evidence we have for what svabhāva is in Nāgārjuna’s historical context,
and thus what Nāgārjuna is denying in TUE, is provided by Gautama’s Nyāyasūtra
and by the early Abhidharma compendium the Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣā (hereafter:
Mahāvibhāṣā)–both roughly contemporaneous with Nāgārjuna. 3 The Nyāyasūtra is
the canonical text of Nāgārjuna’s Naiyāyika opponents. The Mahāvibhāṣā presents
the kind of reductive analysis that informs the understanding of svabhāva of
Nāgārjuna’s Ābhidharmika opponents, as well as introducing a specifically
ontological distinction between ultimate (paramārtha) and conventional
(prajñapti/saṃvṛti) truth.4 If Nāgārjuna aims to engage with the philosophy of his
day, we should expect Nāgārjuna to be responding to the understanding of svabhāva
that is presented and defended in these texts, as well as to the distinction drawn in
earlier literature between what is ultimate and what is conventional.
The first important thing to note about Nāgārjuna’s position relative to these texts
is that he does not mean to deny the claims of commonsense in denying that
phenomena have svabhāva. Nāgārjuna and his Naiyāyika and Ābhidharmika
opponents share a commitment to commonsense. By this I mean that they agree that,
as we ordinarily assert, there are different kinds of things that are classified into kinds
in virtue of having certain characteristic features. They also agree that there are
accurate and inaccurate ways to represent those things and the world they constitute.
All sides acknowledge, for example, that seeds give rise to sprouts, that cows have
dewlaps, that smoke is evidence of fire, and that horned rabbits don’t exist. This is
particularly evident in the use of reductio-style arguments (prasaṅga and tarka) by
Nāgārjuna and his Naiyāyika opponents that argue against the opposing view by
attempting to show that that opposing view fails to conform to the type of
commonsense views articulated above. For example, in verse 70 of the
Vigrahavyāvartanī (hereafter: VV) Nāgārjuna states that
For whom there is emptiness, there are all things. For whom there is no emptiness, there
is nothing whatsoever (Westerhoff 2010, 42).

In chapter 24 of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (hereafter: MMK), he also says the
following:
24.14 All is possible when emptiness is possible. Nothing is possible when emptiness is
impossible.
24.16 If you look upon existents as real intrinsically, in that case you regard existents as
being without cause and conditions.
3

The dates for these and Nāgārjuna’s text are contentious but the best evidence so far suggests that
these texts represent ideas from roughly the same historical period–2nd Century CE. For more about
Nāgārjuna’s historical context see Walser (2005) and Westerhoff (2009).
4
For my discussion of the Mahāvibhāṣā I am relying on Cox (2004).
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24.17 Effect and cause, as well as agent, instrument and act, arising and ceasing, and fruit
–all these you thereby deny.
24.38 The world would be unproduced, unceased, and unchangeable, it would be devoid
of its manifold appearances, if there were intrinsic nature. (Katsura & Siderits 2013, 276277 & 287)

Similarly, the Naiyāyika Vātsyāyana in his commentary to Nyāyasūtra 4.1.38 argues
that
if there were non-existence [abhāva] (as alleged by the Buddhists) things would be
indescribable and featureless, they would not have distinctive properties captured in
common ideas about being and so on. But we do find such properties. And thus it is not
the case that everything lacks substantial existence [svabhāva] (Phillips and Dasti, 98).5

An examination of these kinds of arguments reveal that all parties in the dispute are
committed to presenting views that are in conformity with commonsense. Each
argument seeks to show that the world of our ordinary experience would not be
possible if the opponent’s view were correct and on that basis concludes that the
opponent’s view must be mistaken. No one, including Nāgārjuna, wishes to deny the
claims of commonsense. Each party in the debate seeks to defend a position that is
consistent with it.
So in TUE, Nāgārjuna is not denying that phenomena exist and have a nature.
One way to make this point is to say that Nāgārjuna accepts that there is bhāva, at
least in some deflated sense of the term ‘bhāva’, a Sanskrit term that means existent,
being, or nature. Mills agrees with this point insofar as he considers Nāgārjuna’s
arguments to target specifically philosophical claims, while leaving ordinary
discourse untouched. What Nāgārjuna specifically denies is that phenomena have or
are svabhāva—the term ‘svabhāva’ at first pass means something like self-nature or
own-nature.
We can best understand what it is that Nāgārjuna is denying when he denies that
phenomena have, or are, svabhāva by examining the way the concept of svabhāva
was used by its proponents in Nāgārjuna’s (most likely) historical context. As the
section of Vātsyāyana’s commentary quoted above indicates, in the Nyāyasūtra, the
term ‘svabhāva’ is used to indicate those properties of an entity that determine the
kind of thing an entity is. Things with the same nature, the same svabhāva, are the
same kind of thing.6 Gautama thus uses svabhāva to explain bhāva; in fact, in verse
5

It is worth noting that the Naiyāyika is not here accurately representing the Madhyamaka position by
characterizing the view as “abhāva.” Svabhāva and bhāva are the same for the Naiyāyikas and so they
often conflate the two senses in characterizing the Buddhist position. This conflation is evident in the
conclusion they draw that specifically cites svabhāva as the subject of their reductio argument. The
reductio would not go through unless they understood svabhāva and bhāva to be the same.
6
Vātsyāyana, in his commentary on verse 4.1.38 uses the ontological categories of the Vaiśeṣika as
examples to help illustrate this point. What makes something a universal (sāmānya), for example, is
that is common to, or inheres in, many substances. A universal is the kind of thing (bhāva) that is
repeatable across instances (Dasti & Phillips 2017, 97-98).

Comparative Philosophy 10.2 (2019)

GUERRERO

93

4.1.38 he equates the two. Entities, he says, are determined by their svabhāva.
Furthermore, in Nyāyasūtra 4.1.39-40 svabhāva is specifically characterized as being
intrinsic as opposed to relational. It is argued that a being must first have its own,
intrinsic nature–its svabhāva—in order for relational properties to even be possible.
Gautama argues for a being to exist and have a nature at all–for it to be a bhāva—it
must have svabhāva, i.e., a nature that is intrinsic to it.
In the Mahāvibhāṣā, we see svabhāva also being used to classify entities. For
example, for these Ābhidharmikas, what makes an earth dharma an earth dharma is
that it is a token of solidity–the defining characteristic, the svabhāva, of earth. Unlike
the Naiyāyikas, however, the Ābhidharmikas use the notion of svabhāva to mark an
ontological distinction between entities (bhāvas)–those that are fundamental (dravyasat) and those entities (bhāvas) that are ontologically dependent (prajñapti-sat). Only
the former are said to have, or rather to be, svabhāva—to have their own, intrinsic,
non-dependent nature (Cox 2004, 569-570). For example, a pot’s solidity is due to its
being composed of earth dharmas, which are themselves tokens of solidity. A pot’s
solidity is not, therefore, an intrinsic characteristic (a svabhāva) of the pot but rather a
dependent one. According to these Ābhidharmikas, none of the pot’s features are
intrinsic. The pot derives its being and its nature from the nature of its more
fundamental constituents. The force of the ‘sva’ in this Abhidharma context thus
indicates non-reducibility and ontological fundamentality.
These early Nyāya and Abhidharma texts demonstrate that the force of the ‘sva’
in ‘svabhāva’ for both these traditions is to indicate a nature (bhāva) that is intrinsic
to the thing in question. In light of all this, if we are being charitable, I think it is
reasonable to conclude that when Nāgārjuna says all phenomena are empty of
svabhāva, what he is denying is specifically that phenomena have their natures
intrinsically–that their bhāva is explained in terms of svabhāva. So the debate can be
summarized in the following way: the Naiyāyika maintain that all bhāva are
svabhāva, the Ābhidharmika maintain that some bhāva are svabhāva, and Nāgārjuna
maintains that no bhāva are svabhāva. The debate between these thinkers concerns
the role that svabhāva plays in accounting for and explaining bhāva. Nāgārjuna
maintains it plays no role, while the Naiyāyikas and the Ābhidharmikas think it does.
The claim that no bhāva are svabhāva, or what amounts to the same thing, the
claim that all phenomena are empty of intrinsic nature, becomes problematic for Mills
when he takes it as itself attributing an intrinsic nature to phenomena—the intrinsic
nature of lacking an intrinsic nature. However, it seems to me that this reading should
be precluded given that Nāgārjuna famously states in MMK 24.18 that emptiness -being empty of intrinsic nature—is itself empty. If being empty of intrinsic nature is
itself empty of intrinsic nature, then we should not read the claim that some entity is
empty as a claim about its intrinsic nature. Keeping a distinction between bhāva and
svabhāva in mind, it stands to reason that Nāgārjuna’s whole point is to challenge the
assumption that ascribing a nature to something entails ascribing an intrinsic nature to
it. However, this is not how Mills understands TUE. He does read TUE as ascribing a
kind of svabhāva to phenomena: the svabhāva of having no svabhāva. It is this
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contradictory or paradoxical ascription that Mills argues is the impetus for the
dialectical move from phase 1 anti-realism to phase 2 quietism.
2. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THE ULTIMATE (PARAMĀRTHA)
The impetus to read TUE as attributing a no-svabhāva svabhāva to things stems from
understanding the claim to be ultimately true and then conflating two distinct senses
of what it means to be ultimate (paramārtha): a hermeneutical sense and an
ontological sense.
In Buddhist philosophy, the distinction between ultimate and conventional truth
first arose from a hermeneutical distinction made in early sūtra literature between
those of the Buddha’s teachings that require interpretation and those whose meaning
is explicit. This distinction later came to be described as a distinction between two
kinds of truth: conventional (saṃvṛti) truth and ultimate (paramārtha) truth.
Karunadasa (2006) explains that in this hermeneutic context, both truths are equally
truths—there is no hierarchy between them. The difference concerns what it is that a
hearer understands when an ordinary statement is made. The idea informing this
sense of the distinction between ultimate and conventional truth is that the wise
person, paradigmatically the Buddha, has an understanding about the nature of reality
that is superior to that of an ordinary person. So whereas an ordinary person thinks of
people and objects as enduring, substantial possible sources of happiness, a wise
person understands that the desire and attachment to such things is really a source of
deep suffering because they are really dependent, impermanent, and non-substantial.
Both the ordinary person and a Buddha see the same phenomena, but the Buddha has
a deeper understanding of their nature than the ordinary person.
For example, the conventional statement ‘There is a person in the chariot’ can be
recognized as true by both the wise and the unenlightened. However, the wise
understand the claim in a way that does not engender suffering because they
understand persons and chariots to be dependent, impermanent, and non-substantial.
For those unenlightened who have a hard time understanding the claim in such a way,
the deeper nature of persons and chariots can be made more explicit—it can be drawn
out—in relation to ultimate statements such as ‘persons are impermanent and lack
substance (ātman),’ which directly state the Buddha’s insights about the nature of
reality—what the wise know. Ultimate truths thus do not invalidate or cheapen the
truth of conventional statements. On the contrary, they provide a richer, enlightened
perspective on the reality that such conventional statements truly describe.
The above hermeneutic use of the distinction, which I will designate ‘ultimate1’
and ‘conventional1’, came first. A distinctively ontological sense of the distinction
between ultimate and conventional arose later in the context of Abhidharma reductive
analysis. I will designate this sense of the distinction ‘ultimate2’ and ‘conventional2’.
In line with the understanding of svabhāva that we see in the Mahāvibhāṣā, these
Ābhidharmika Buddhists use this ontological sense of ‘ultimate’ and ‘conventional’
to distinguish between two ways in which something might be said to be real. On the
one hand there is “conventional reality” (prajñapti or saṃvṛti) which is the world of
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our commonsense experience that is composed of ordinary, composite objects such as
cows, pots, and people. In contrast to this, there is an underlying “ultimate reality”
(dravya) that is composed of the fundamental entities with svabhāva, called
‘dharmas,’ on which conventional reality depends. Statements about what is
ultimately real are described as ultimately true when they correspond to the way the
world ultimately is. These statements directly refer only to entities that are ultimately
real. On the other hand, statements about conventional entities are described as
conventionally true when they correspond to the way the world conventionally is – a
way that in turn depends on how things stand at the ultimate level.
In early Buddhist literature there are, therefore, two different notions of ‘ultimate’
(paramārtha) at play. The qualifier ‘ultimate’ in the phrases ‘ultimate reality’ or
‘ultimate truth’ can thus be understood in two different ways:
Ultimate1: reality/truth as it is known by the wise (i.e., enlightened beings like the
Buddha)
Ultimate2: A technical sense introduced by the Ābhidharmikas to indicate reality that is
fundamental, i.e., real existence (dravya) that is determined by svabhāva and the truths
regarding that reality.

Ultimate1 reflects a hermeneutic use of the distinction between ultimate and
conventional. Ultimate2, developed later in Abhidharma texts like the Mahāvibhāṣā,
on the other hand, has ontological implications that ultimate1 does not have.
The ultimate truth of TUE only entails that it ascribes a no-svabhāva svabhāva if
we take its ultimate truth in the second, ontological sense. But I see no reason to read
it that way. Nāgārjuna’s Ābhidharmika opponents equate ultimate1 with ultimate2
because of their metaphysics. According to them, the deep insight of the wise,
ultimate1, is precisely the knowledge of what is fundamentally real, ultimate2.
However, given that Nāgārjuna rejects that metaphysics, I see good reason to deny he
would equate them in the same way—the way required in order to generate the
contradiction that would undermine tendency (1) claims thereby motivating the
dialectical move to Mills’ proposed skeptical position. Especially at the relatively
early dates that Nāgārjuna was writing, I do not think we can presume that ultimate1
and ultimate2 are accepted by all Buddhists as being coextensive.
The equivocation that results in taking TUE to be paradoxical or self-refuting I
think goes like this:
(1) TUE is ultimately1 true.
(2) Ultimate2 truth is truth about how the world fundamentally is (i.e., what is ultimately2
real)
(3) Therefore, TUE expresses how the world fundamentally is (i.e., what is ultimately2
real)
(4) TUE states that all phenomena are empty of svabhāva.
(5) Therefore, the world is fundamentally without svabhāva, (i.e., what is ultimately2 real
is without svabhāva.)
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(6) What the world is fundamentally, what is ultimately2 real, is determined by its
svabhāva.
(7) Therefore, the world has the fundamental nature of having no fundamental nature
(i.e., the svabhāva of what is ultimately2 real is to be without svabhāva).

One arrives at the self-contradictory or paradoxical (7) only by first equivocating in
(3) between ultimate1 truth and ultimate2 truth. (3) only follows from (1) and (2) if
one equivocates in this way. Nāgārjuna clearly takes TUE to be ultimately true. The
question is, in what sense? Given the various criticisms Nāgārjuna levels against the
kind of Abhidharma metaphysics that underpins the ontological distinction between
ultimate2 and conventional2, I think it stands to reason that he has the hermeneutic
distinction in mind. If that is right, then the argument that paradox or selfcontradiction result from TUE rests on an equivocation.
Westerhoff (2009) also addresses the concern that TUE is self-defeating and
comes to a similar conclusion as I do here. Also citing historical evidence, he
differentiates between three different senses of ‘svabhāva’: essence-svabhāva, which
is equivalent to the deflated notion of bhāva I have been using, substance-svabhāva,
which is an ontological notion equivalent to svabhāva, and absolute-svabhāva, which
is a notion introduced by a later commentator on Nāgārjuna, Candrakīrti, to explain
the sense in which emptiness is the ultimate nature of all things, the ultimate truth. In
Candrakīrtian terms, the problematic argument outlined above understands the notion
of absolute-svabhāva in terms of substance-svabhāva. This is the reading that is
required in order for TUE to generate paradox: TUE denies that entities have
substance-svabhāva but then in identifying their absolute-svabhāva, thereby attributes
a substance-svabhāva to them. Westerhoff argues, however, that ascribing absolutesvabhāva, emptiness, to all things is not to ascribe a substance-svabhāva to that thing.
Rather, absolute-svabhāva is a way of describing the essential-svabhāva of things
(46). In other words, in describing the ultimate nature of things in the sense of
absolute-svabhāva, what Nāgārjuna is doing is describing the ordinary nature of
things (their bhāva) as understood by someone who does not falsely project
substance-svabhāva onto them. Candrakīrti’s absolute-svabhāva on Westerhoff’s
reading has the sense of ultimate1 and Westerhoff’s claim that Candrakīrti’s absolutesvabhāva constitutes essence-svabhāva not substance-svabhāva would be that the
ultimate1 truth is that nothing is ultimately2 true. Since ‘ultimate’ is being used in two
different ways in the claim, no paradox results.7
Understood this way, TUE is unproblematically applied to emptiness itself. The
claim that emptiness is empty amounts to the view that lacking svabhāva is not itself
a svabhāva, or in other words, that lacking intrinsic features is not itself an intrinsic
feature. Since to ascribe a nature to something is not necessarily to ascribe an intrinsic
nature, we need not think of the lack of intrinsic nature as itself a kind of intrinsic
nature. In fact, the claim that emptiness is empty seems to follow from the notion of
7

This is a point made also by Siderits when explaining why the paradoxical sounding slogan “the
ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth” is not actually paradoxical. Siderits explains that the
paradox is resolved by disambiguating two different senses of the term ‘ultimate’ (Siderits 2007, 202).
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emptiness itself. Emptiness as Nāgārjuna understands it is a second-order property
that depends on the nature of the first-order characteristic features an entity has. This
makes having or lacking svabhāva itself a dependent property. If those specific, firstorder characteristics are not had intrinsically, as Nāgārjuna demonstrates again and
again in the MMK, then it follows that the entity does not have svabhāva as a secondorder property. If the features an entity has are not intrinsic, then the second-order
property of lacking svabhāva (if it can be characterized as a positive property at all!),
which depends on those dependent properties, would also be dependent. The
dependence of the first-order properties would extend to the second-order properties
that in turn depend on them. So it makes perfect sense on Nāgārjuna’s view that
emptiness would itself be empty since emptiness, itself understood as a characteristic,
is the kind of characteristic (like being long or being a whole) that depends on other
characteristics, which are themselves empty.
3. THE ULTIMATE1 TRUTH IS THE CONVENTIONAL2 TRUTH
On the reading I am advocating here, Nāgārjuna’s TUE is a claim about the world of
our commonsense experience. TUE claims that that world is not really divided into
entities that are ultimate2 and conventional2 because there are no ultimate2 entities. In
this sense everything can be said to be conventional2, although in the absence of the
contrasting class of ultimate2 entities it is unclear exactly what this amounts to. All
we can say for sure about conventional2 entities is that they lack svabhāva. Ultimate1
and conventional1 truth concerns the ordinary, conventional world. However, insofar
as ordinary people often, maybe inevitably, project the notion of svabhāva onto
things, they lack the wisdom of the wise ones who see the ultimate1 truth that the
conventional world lacks the svabhāva that the unenlightened project. It is just one
world that is known by both ordinary people and the wise, the wise just understand it
better, without delusion.
That TUE is intended as a conventional2 truth is supported by passages such as
MMK 24:18, which states
That which is dependently originated, that we declare to be emptiness. This emptiness
being itself dependent (prajñapti), that is the middle way.8

In the first line of this verse Nāgārjuna explains that anything that is dependently
originated has emptiness as its nature. In other words, things that have their nature in
dependence on other things do not have their natures intrinsically. They lack
svabhāva and are thus empty. There is some controversy on how to interpret the
second line of this important verse.9 However, one common way to read Nāgārjuna
holds that he is explicitly including emptiness itself among the phenomena that are
dependent and empty. He uses the term ‘prajñapti’ here, which is the term the
8
9

My translation made in consultation with Katsura and Siderits (2013) and Garfield (1995).
See, for example, Berger (2010, 2011), Garfield and Westerhoff (2011).
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Mahāvibhāṣā uses, as we saw above, to indicate the ontological status of ordinary
objects. The Ābhidharmikas consider ordinary objects to be prajñapti and not
fundamentally existent (dravya) precisely because they lack intrinsic natures and
derive their nature from what the Ābhidharmikas consider to be more fundamental
things. Describing emptiness as prajñapti suggests that Nāgārjuna considers
emptiness to be of a kind with all other ordinary, conventional bhāvas. If it is the
nature of things to be empty, then that nature of being empty is also not intrinsic. And
this is a perfectly sensible thing to say given that lacking an intrinsic nature is not the
kind of nature that could be intrinsic.
If dependently-arisen natures are non-intrinsic ones, and thus not ultimately2 real
(dravya) by the criteria laid out by early Abhidharma texts, then on Nāgārjuna’s view
all phenomena are at best conventionally2 real (prajñapti-sat) or relationally real
(āpekṣika-sat) by that standard. But the ontological distinction between ultimate2 and
conventional2 entities is drawn on the presumption that there is some ontological
foundation grounded in the notion of svabhāva. Since Nāgārjuna denies that there is
any such foundation, the distinction collapses. All there is, on Nāgārjuna’s view, is
conventional2 reality. In this respect, Nāgārjuna’s view is not that different from that
of the Naiyāyikas who also reject the notion of levels of reality. There is, according to
these thinkers, just the one reality of commonsense. However, unlike the Naiyāyikas,
Nāgārjuna does not take that reality to itself serve as a realist ontological foundation.
Rather, he denies the sense of positing such a foundation in the first place. He does
not, however, deny that world of commonsense and, given that this world is the only
world for him, TUE must be about that world.
4. CONCLUSION
I have argued here that there are good reasons not to read TUE in a way that results in
it undermining itself. And if I am right about this, I see little motivation for reading
Nāgārjuna as a skeptic about philosophy. Without the dialectical move between
tendency (1) and tendency (2) claims, such a reading does not reconcile them, and
given that the anti-realist interpretation does offer a way to do so, it remains the most
plausible interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s work. I therefore conclude that Nāgārjuna is
not, after all, one of the pillars of skepticism in classical India.
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